The growth rate of climate forcing by measured greenhouse gases peaked near 1980 at almost 5 W/m 2 per century. This growth rate has since declined to _3 W/m a per century, largely because of cooperative international actions. We argue that trends can be reduced to the level needed for the moderate "alternative" climate scenario (_2 W/m z per century for the next 50 years) by means of concerted actions that have other benefits, but the forcing reductions are not automatic "co-benefits" of actions that slow CO2 emissions. Current trends of climate forcings by aerosols remain very uncertain. Nevertheless, practical constraints on changes in emission levels suggest that global warming at a rate +0.15 ± 0.05°C per decade will occur over the _ext several decades.
The growth rate of climate forcing by measured greenhouse gases peaked near 1980 at almost 5 W/m 2 per century. This growth rate has since declined to _3 W/m a per century, largely because of cooperative international actions. We argue that trends can be reduced to the level needed for the moderate "alternative" climate scenario (_2 W/m z per century for the next 50 years) by means of concerted actions that have other benefits, but the forcing reductions are not automatic "co-benefits" of actions that slow CO2 emissions. Current trends of climate forcings by aerosols remain very uncertain. Nevertheless, practical constraints on changes in emission levels suggest that global warming at a rate +0.15 ± 0.05°C per decade will occur over the _ext several decades. ' lobal surface temperature incre_sed in the past century by | more than 0.5°C (1, 2) . This wal ming is, at least in part, a result of anthropogenic climate forci ag agents (3 We emphasize the importance of other forcings that an not well measured. Fig. 1 shows estimates of climate fo:cings since 1850. Most of these are similar to previous estimates (3, 5) , but a few key forcings warrant discussion.
Climate Forcings
Methane. The estimated CH4 forcing is half as large as that for CO2. CH4 is included in the Kyoto Protocol but with a small weight compared with CO2. We wili argue that CH4 deserves greater attention and should not be I,tmped together with CO2. The CH4 forcing of 0.7 W/m 2, composed of 0.5 W/m 2 direct forcing and 0.2 W/m 2 indirect forcilig, is based on line-by-line radiation calculations using current absorption line data (5) . Recent estimates of the direct forcin!; based in part on satellite measurements of CH4 (6, 7) are slig _tly larger than our value, whereas the Intergovernmental P;,nel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimate of 0.49 W/m 2 for 1750-2000 (3) is slightly smaller.
Our calculated indirect forcing of f_l W/m 2 for CH4 oxidized to H20 in the stratosphere (5) , based on a chemical transport model (8) , requires only one-third of the observed stratospheric H20 increase (9) to be ascribed to CH4. The indirect forcing of 0.1 W/m 2 for the effect of increasil g CH4 on 03 (5) (8, 19) . Although the sum of _dl forcings coincidentally is similar to that for CO2 alone, knowh_'dge of each of the large forcings in Fig. 1 is needed for development of effective policies. In-Situ Data o_
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In-Situ Data ,¢'; ', ' ' 'aooo The annual growth of CO2 increased rapidly between World War II and the oil crisis of the mid-1970s, an interval during which fossil fuel CO2 emissions increased exponentially at more than 4%/year.
Since then the annual CO2 growth has been relatively flat at about 1.5 ppm/year.
As fossil fuel CO2 emissions have increased at about l%/year during the past 25 years (see below), the flat growth rate implies some increase in the net terrestrial and/or oceanic uptakes of CO2. Fig. 2B shows the growth rate of atmospheric CH4. After World War II the annual growth of CH4 increased from about 5 ppb/year to about 15 ppb/year. Even though data are limited for 1965-1985, it is clear, based on the prior and subsequent absolute CH4 amounts, that growth averaged about 15 ppb/year during that period. Since 1980 the CH4 growth rate has declined by about two-thirds.
Causes of the slower CH4 growth are uncertain, as both a leveling off of CH4 sources (21, 22) and a decreasing CH4 lifetime (23-25) may contribute. Better measurements are needed of the trends of CH4 sources and emissions that affect atmospheric OH, the primary sink for CH4. Fig. 3 shows the growth rate for climate forcing by several chlorofluorocarbons, hydrochlorofluorocarbons, chlorocarbons, and bromocarbons, which we abbreviate together as CFCs.
Trace Gas Forcing Growth Rate Global Warming Potentials Fig. 1 indicates that several climate forc ng agents are significant. Thus it is important to compare the efft ctiveness of reducing the emissions of each of these constituents. For that purpose IPCC (3) uses global warming potentials (GWPs). IPCC defines GWPs relative to Ct)2 and weights them by constituent lifetime. The detour of GWP through properties of CO2 makes it unnecessarily difficult to relate a change in emissions to expected global warmi1_g. The Kyoto Protocol chooses the 100-year GWP, which makes it appear that shortlived constituents have little value for slowing global warming. We propose an alternative GWP (GWPa). GWPa is simply the change in climate forcing caused by a _hange in emissions. This forcing can be converted to an expected long-term global temperature change by multiplying by ,:limate sensitivity, which is estimated from empirical evidence ;_nd climate models to be 3//4 "l-1//4°C per W/m 2 (29) . We choose 50 years as the principal lime frame. One hundred years is too long, because we cannot di_cern technology changes that will occur by 2100. A time frame less than several decades is inappropriate, because of the long lift of energy infrastructure. The present climate forcing by each constituent enters as a simple product (Table 1) . Thus the loving change as a function of emission change can be adjusted as knowledge of the present forcing improves. We use a BC forcing (0.6 W/m 2) smaller than in Fig. 1 and closer to other estimates (13), thus strengthening conclusions below. The sulfate forci_lg includes little or no aerosol indirect forcing and is especia ly uncertain.
We illustrate GWPa by considering plausible changes in the climate forcing agents and examining whether these would be sufficient to achieve the "alternative sc,mario" that we proposed previously (5) . That scenario aims to keep the added climate forcing in the next 50 years at 1 W/m 2 9r less, and thus keep the global warming in that period at %°C or less (5, 8) .
Carbon Dioxide. IPCC scenarios for (O2 are a product of assumptions for population, living standards, energy sources, and technology, resulting in a huge range c:f CO2 trends (3, 14) . Our approach is to use the historical CO2 emissions curve ( Fig. 5 ), which includes these factors. We expe_ t the energy supply/cost factors that caused the growth rate to decline from 4-4.5%/year to 1-1.5%/year to continue. We corsider possible additional downward pressure caused by climate concerns.
If CO2 continues to increase 1.5 ppm/year, which would require that global emissions be kept tbout the same as today, the added forcing in 50 years will be _-1.08 W/m 2 (5) . Achieve-ment of flat CO2 emissions will require major efforts in energy efficiency, fuel switching, and renewable energies. If, rather than being constant, CO2 emissions increase exponentially at 1.5%/year, the added forcing in 50 years is 1.54 W/m z. This growth rate is perhaps the largest plausible one, exceeding that of the past 25 years. If 1.5%/year growth occurs in developing countries and emissions in developed countries are constant at the 2000 level, the added forcing is 1.28 W/m 2 ( Table 1) .
Methane.The IPCC estimate of additional CH4 forcing between 2000 and 2050 declined to 0.04-0.31 W/m 2 in their recent report (3) from 0.17-0.44 W/m 2 in their previous report. Methane growth in the 1990s fell well below all IPCC scenarios (5) .
Our alternative scenario (5) aims for a 30% reduction of CH4 forcing by means of actions such as improved agricultural practices and capture of CH4 escaping from landfills, coal mining, oil and gas production, and anaerobic waste management lagoons. The required reduction of anthropogenic CH4 sources is _-25%, because of OH feedback (30) . These actions have economic benefits that help offset costs (31) , but they are unlikely to occur without global cooperation and sharing of technology.
A 30% reduction of the CH4 forcing yields a negative forcing of -0.21 W/m 2 ( Table 1 ). This diminution of climate forcing is comparable to that expected in the next 50 years from the Kyoto Protocol, which aims to reduce GHG emissions of developed countries by the equivalent of _5% of their CO2 emissions.
Air Pollution. IPCC scenarios (3) have air pollution, and thus climate forcing by 03 and BC, increasing in the next 50 years.
We argue that human and economic costs of air pollution make a global focus on air pollution desirable, if not inevitable (5) .
Air pollution growth will slow as a co-benefit of slower fossil fuel growth. However, we contend that absolute reductions of 03 and BC are possible. BC is a product of incomplete combustion, whereas 03 is produced by emissions of reactive organic gases (ROGs), NOx, CO, and CH4 (30) . Improved combustion technologies can reduce emissions of both BC and 03 precursors (32) . If anthropogenic CH4 is reduced 30%, emissions of ROGs, NOx, and CO must be reduced about 40% to achieve a 30% reduction of anthropogenic 03 (re/. 30; M. Prather, personal communication).
We suggest that 30% reduction of global 03 pollution by 2050 is a realistic goal (5), based on reductions in some developed countries (32) and technology trends. BC (soot) emissions are sensitive to industrial and vehicular technologies (33) and domestic cooking and heating technologies (34) . Our alternative scenario (5) aims to reduce anthropogenic BC emissions enough to balance warming from reduced sulfates (Table 1) . Sulfates, the main source of acid rain, need to be reduced, so we suggest an emphasis on also reducing BC.
Aerosol climate forcing will be very uncertain until global composition-specific aerosol measurements allow definition of trends. Our estimated forcing of +0.3 W/m 2 for reduction of reflective aerosols does not include changes of the indirect aerosol effect, which is very uncertain. If the indirect aerosol forcing is large, reduction of reflecting aerosols could seriously aggravate global warming. Given that oceans cover 70% of the world, one stop-gap strategy may be to allow ships to continue to use high sulfur fuel for a time. However, we do not recommend use of one pollutant to mask the effect of another. It may be possible to minimize undesirable effects with optimum prioritization and sequencing of emission reductions, but recommendations require better understanding of aerosol climate forcings and their environmental effects.
Other Forcings. Fig. 3 , is in accord with the Montreal Protocol and IPCC (3) estimates, as is the resulting stratospheric O3 recovery. Trace in Table 1 refers to trace g,ses outside the Montreal Protocol, including perfluorocarbons hydrofluorocarbons, and SF6. IPCC (3) scenarios yield a forcin{,, ranging from 0.09 to 0.19 W/m E.The higher values are caused n_ainly by HFC-134a, whose growth rate has fallen below IPCC _stimates. We assume an additional forcing of 0.1 W/m 2 by these trace gases; however, it could be reduced by minimizing HF(:-I34a production (5) .
Net GWPa, 2000-2050. The added climate forcing in the next 50 years is 0.85 W/m 2 if CO2 growth is flat at 1.5 ppm/year and if the above reductions of CH4, 03, and BC are achieved. Kyoto emission reductions do not appear explicitly in this case, but note that keeping CO2 emissions flat surely requires improved energy efficiencies, fuel switching, and alternative energy sources as envisaged under Kyoto emission restrictions.
If global CO2 emissions increase er,ponentially at 1.5%/year for the next 50 years, but air pollutk:n and CH4 emissions are reduced as suggested above, the forci,lg increase is 1.31 W/m 2. This forcing scenario exceeds the goa of 1 W/m 2 or less in the alternative scenario. Moreover, the forcing growth rate is accelerating in 2050, contrary to the go,I of decelerating toward stabilization of atmospheric composition later in the century. Fig. 7 summarizes differences between the alternative scenario and IPCC scenarios (3). First, CH4, ()3, and BC increase in the IPCC scenarios, whereas the alternalive scenario has a global reduction of air pollution. Second, the IPCC includes CO2 growth rates that we contend are unt eatistically large.
Our approach for CO2 is to study _istorical emission trends ( Fig. 5 ) and consider plausible chang:s. Exponential emissions growth at 1.5%/year for 50 years yields a CO2 forcing of 1.54 W/m 2 ( Table 1) . A forcing of 3 _/m 2 requires more than 4%/year exponential growth for 51i years. Such a scenario understates trends toward improved ,mergy efficiency and decarbonization of energy sources (figure 8 in ref. 35 ). The factors that caused the growth rate to slow fiom 4%/year to l%/year since the 1970s remain in place and are joined by a slowing population growth rate (36) and international concerns about global warming. Reacceleration fron l%/year to 4%/year growth does not seem credible.
GlobalWarming,2000-2050.
A byproduct of the above analysis is the conclusion that future global warming can be predicted much more accurately than is generally realized. We show elsewhere (8) that a forcing of 1.08 W/m 2yields i warming of 3/4°Cby 2050 in transient climate simulations with a model having equilibrium sensitivity of %°C per W/m e.
We contend that a forcing much s, aaller than 0.85 W/m 2 is unlikely, because fossil fuels are exl_ected to be the primary energy source for at least several decades. Rapid introduction of nonfossil energies or CO2 sequestration might reduce the forcing by a few tenths of 1 W/m 2. However, much of the warming in the next 50 years will be from presently "unrealized warming" caused by the existing planetary radiative imbalance of at least 0.5 W/m 2 (8, 37) . Slowing CO2 emissions in the second quartile of the century, although crucial for stabilizing atmospheric composition later in the century, would have only a small effect on the warming in 2050. These considerations suggest a minimum warming of 0.5°C by 2050.
At the other extreme, CO2 growth exceeding exponential at 1.5%/year would be inconsistent with historical trends and with the negative feedback caused by human concern about climate change. Thus the maximum COz forcing is 1.28-1.54 W/m 2 ( Table 1) . BC and 03 are unlikely to be much greater in 2050 than today. Indeed, China has already begun to reduce its air pollution (38) and other developing countries are probably near their limits. Continued global warming would produce at least moderate public concern, thus limiting added forcing to about 1.5 W/m z and realized warming to about I°C.
Given these constraints on climate forcing trends, we predict additional warming in the next 50 years of 3/4 -+ ¼°C, a warming rate of 0.15 _+ 0.05°C per decade. A slower warming rate will occur in the second half of the century, assuming that the climate forcing growth rate begins to trend downward before 2050. 
Summary
Methane.
CH4 has analogies to CFCs. Technologies are within reach for reducing CH4 emissions. As with CFCs, the cost of actions to reduce CH4 can be much less than the cost of dealing with CO2. Developed countries, in addition to reducing their own sources, could support the implementation of required technologies in developing countries. By targeting emission reductions that have some economic benefits, it should be possible to find self-sustaining reductions. Methane, with a climate forcing half as great as that of CO2, provides an opportunity for a global warming success story. A halt and even reversal of its growth is possible, it could occur quickly, and it could provide an example for cooperation on CO:. Success in halting or even reversing growth of CH4 will not remove the need to slow CO2 emissions.
Air Pollution. Ozone and aerosols are prime air pollutants. All countries have strong incentives for reducing air pollution, which affects human health and agricultural productivity.
In India alone it is estimated that 270,000 children under age 5 die each year of acute respiratory infections caused by particulate air pollution (39) . Global deaths from air pollution are at least one million annually (40) . Economic costs in several European countries are estimated at 1.6% of their gross domestic products (41) .
Climate forcing by 03 and BC aerosols combined may be comparable to that of CO2 ( Fig. 1 ), yet neither constituent is included in the Kyoto Protocol. Some reduction in air pollution may occur as an incidental cobenefit of reduced fossil fuel use, but the small Kyoto emission reduction may be unnoticeable. Much larger reductions of air pollution are feasible. Achievement requires a strategy that explicitly targets 03 and BC. Here again there is a need and opportunil_, for and concern about climate change increases, it may become feasible to achieve a slowing of CO2 emissions and a forcing growth rate even smaller than 1 W/m 2 in 50 years.
Global Warming. Current trends and projections of climate forcings lead us to predict global warming for several decades at a rate 0.15 -+ 0.05°C per decade. Although this warming is more moderate than in business-as-usual scenarios, if it is maintained for a century the Earth's temperature will approach that of the middle Pliocene (2.75 million years ago), when the world was about 2°C warmer than today and sea level was at least 25 m higher (43) . This conclusion supports the need for actions that slow the growth of climate forcings.
It is now impossible
to avoid global warming this century. 
